

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 April 1955

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 13-55: COMMUNIST CHIMA'S CAPABILITIES
AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA THROUGH 1960,
dated 12 April 1955, revised Section VI, Sino-Soviet
Relations

VI. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S.C.

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HB 10-2

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## A. Current Relations

- Indicate the evidence for and nature of any change in Sino-Soviet relations as defined in paragraphs
   and 19 of NIE 10-7-54.
- 2. What is the present general extent and nature of Soviet economic assistance to Communist China? Of military assistance? What are the political, economic, and military strings attached to Soviet assistance?
- 3. What evidence is there, if any, indicating (a) the role of Peiping in the formation and execution of Bloc policy in the Far East; and (b) the channels through which Soviet influence is exerted at the





decision-making level in the CCP, and the receptivity of Peiping to Moscow's advice?

- 4. What evidence is there of divergent views, if any, concerning strategy in Asia and the degree of risks to be run by Peiping in its foreign policies, particularly with respect to the Taiwan Straits area?
- or to reduce Sino-Soviet cooperation? Include
  a discussion of the significance of the following:

  (a) Moscow's efforts to retain a paramount position
  within the Bloc and as spokesman and leader of the
  world Communist movement; (b) possible Soviet desires,
  for domestic economic reasons, to limit assistance to
  Communist China, and the actual levels of present
  assistance; (c) possible differences between Peiping
  and Moscow over the correct approach to and pace of
  industrialization and collectivization in China;
  (d) possible desires of Peiping to reduce China's
  economic and military dependence on the USSR or to
  limit Soviet influence within China; (e) possible

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competition for leadership in Asia, particularly of the various national Communist parties; (f) possible conflicting interests in the border areas; (g) the differing backgrounds, experience, and interests of the Soviet and Chinese elites; the traditional disinterest of the Russian peoples in Asia and the traditional xenophobia and developing nationalism of the Chinese, including Communist cadres.

- 6. What are the principal factors and conditions that tend to enhance prospects of continued Sino-Soviet cooperation?
- 7. Is there any evidence that either party desires to modify the present relationship to better serve its own interests?

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